Getting dizzy

errancy@freethought.tamu.edu errancy@freethought.tamu.edu
Sat, 25 Nov 95 12:42 CST (00817346520, 951125133845_33546319@emout06.mail.aol.com)


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In a message dated 95-11-25 12:33:32 EST, RHutchin@aol.com writes:


>RH: Because I see the stars and the tress and the animals and I know that
>all these things could not have just appeared out of nothing.

Knoldege base on what?

What you are saying is that since YOU don't *understand* how these things could come to be, that therefore God did it.

Which leads to the point that then God himself must be at least as complicated as those things, so where did he come from.

Which puts you right back at the beggining of the universe and up against the limits of that which is even theorectically knowable given our physical limitations.

Remember my theory of origin via the flatulance of the meta-cosomic amoemba?

What you, or any one else doesn't know proves nothing but what they don't know, it is not sufficient to prove the truth of anything else.

You have already demonstrated that you have essentially no understanding of physics, astronomy, information theory, logic, biology, molecular biolology, geology, geophysics, etc., etc.

So based on knwoing nothing about how the world works, you proceed to say that god is the only explanation?

You skipped a few steps, to say the least.

Just for you I am attaching a short essay on epistemology. Needs some editing which I never seem to get around to, but maybe you'll find it enlightening.

ttfn

mike in ca.

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=0D

=2E The first, the most basic truth which any one can know, with absolute=

assurance, is that they exist. As Descartes said, "Cogito, ergo sum"; I think, therefor I am. =0D

The second truth that I can know absolutely is that of my experience of = the sensations provided to me by my senses. The philosophical term for these = is 'qualia'. My experiencing of qualia is as certain to me as my experiencin= g of consciousness itself. =0D The third truth that can be know absolutely is that of the tautology. "T= all people are tall", "5+3 =3D 6+2", "If a=3Db and b=3Dc, then a=3Dc", are a= ll examples of simple tautologies. Higher math and symbolic logic are complex, but tautological systems. However, deductive reasoning from a set of axioms i= s incapable of discovering new knowledge or knowledge outside the system. Certain aspects of math and logic appear= , based on experience to closely parallel aspects of the 'real world', but = that is a connection made by minds not bound by the closed system. =0D

I may choose not to believe the sensations I experience, my qualia, no matter how vivid, and maintain that everything I experience, is some kind=

of illusion created by my own mind. This is called solipsism. Other than bei= ng irrefutable it has nothing to recommend itself as a philosophy. =0D

In summary, these are the three things I can be absolutely sure of A Pri= ora (without experience): =0D 1. My existence. =0D 2. My experiencing of sensations. =0D 3. Tautologies. =0D

If I accept my qualia as representing a world external to myself, then = it is up to me to sort out and organize my qualia in a manner that allows me=

to predict what will happen in that world. I must build an internalized mode= l of the external world which is accurate enough to allow me to function witho= ut performing actions which are harmful to myself (walking off a cliff), to perform actions which are helpful (ob= tain food), and to predict the actions of independent objects in that world (i= s that falling rock going to hit me?). =0D

It is critical at this point to recognize that once I extend my universe=

outside my own mind, outside that of which I can be A Priora certain, tha= t my knowledge is no longer absolute. Any knowledge outside the three categori= es I have listed is uncertain to various degrees since it involves inductive reasoning. That is I must take a limited number of experiences and decide whether or not the world always works th= e same way. This is the basic problem of epistemology, how do we determine = the validity of our information? How do I decide what is reliable knowledge a= nd what is not? =

=0D

This affects religious knowledge also, for I can only know what I expedience, and that includes the experience of words, both written and spoken. How do I choose between the Buddhist priest, the Hindu Swami, th= e Christian missionary, or the secular philosopher, to name a few world vie= ws? =0D

How do we test our knowledge for reliability?Let us begin. =0D

One of the most general and important tests is that of universality. Whatever is true in one place at one time should always be true at that p= lace at any other time, and also at other places at all times. If it is not th= en the belief is either false (the gamblers lucky charm which works so inconsistently afte= r the first time) or incomplete (the spectrum of a black body does not foll= ow a smooth line with regard to temperature because energy exists as discrete 'quanta', not a continually variable 'fluid'). Radios work in the U.S., i= n China, and even out past Pluto (so long Voyager!!). Our knowledge of physics passes this and a huge numberof other tests and = is thus very reliable. =0D

Another important test is parsimony, or Occam's razor. Simply stated, entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity. If what you already k= now is adequate to explain a phenomena, then don't invent some new force or entity just to make an explanation that's a little tidier or easier to understand. Copernicus's theory did not make the mathematics of calculati= ng celestial movement much easier than Potomelys, but it required no special=

assumptions thrown in just to make it work like Potomelys. =0D

A related concept is that of congruity. I expect new knowledge to fit in=

with what I have already learned to be reliable. And the more I have alre= ady learned, the greater my confidence is in my basic knowledge. Relativity a= nd Quantum Mechanics were quickly accepted by the scientific community becau= se they werecongruent with what was already known, and explained very real problems with some basic data without contradicting anything that was alr= eady known. Newtonian mechanics and classical physics simply became subsets of=

the new paradigm. =0D

God is not part of science not because of any conspiracy on the part of = the scientific community, at least some of whom are belivers in various diffe= rent religious traditions, but simply because no such entity has yet been requ= ired to explain the data. Further, if once you start invoking any kind of conscious entity to explain some inconvienient data, you lose congurity, parsimony and universiality. In short, you can no longer do science because you can no longer trust the w= orld to behave according to rules. =0D

Judeo-Christian apologists have tried various ways of proving the existe= nce of god, and for the sake of bandwidth I'll address them with one refutati= on. The most active thread I have seen arguing for gods existence is the orig= in of the universe (science having pretty well explained most more convenien= t phenomena). =

=0D The argument follows this general shape: =0D Cosmologist: Our physics breaks down at the Plank time. We have no theory=

that is adequate to explain what was happening then. =0D Apologist: Aha! Just as I thought, you have no idea where the universe ca= me from then, right? =0D Cosmologist: Well, I have an idea, but I lack any scientific proof. =0D Apologist: Well then, isn't it obvious? God must have made it all! He can=

do anything he wants! =0D This is sometimes refered to as the "Fourth of July argument". =

=0D An example: =0D Fool: Hey Socrates, what day is it today? =0D Socrates: I'm not sure, I've been meditating for the last few days and se= em to have misplaced my calander. =0D Fool: Well, is it the Forth of July? =0D Socrates: Well, as I said, I misplaced my calender and I'm not an astrono= mer so I can't check the stars. But I went into retreat in June, so it might = be. =2E . =0D Fool: Well, if you can't prove it's the fourth of July, then it must be Christmas! =

=0D

In other words, the fool is claiming that if Socartes can't prove his assertion, then his explanation must be correct. Obviously (in this case)=

the only 'proof' the fool has is that Socrates can't prove the contrary. But = the only thing anyones lack of knowledge on a subject can prove, is his lack = of knowledge. It does not prove anything, one way or the other, about any other conjectures. Therefore the argument from creation ("first cause") fails, because it tells me nothing new, and sugg= ests no way to find an answer. =0D

The argument from revelation (or faith) fails from too much competition,=

to put it succinctly. The Hindu, the Moslem, the Buddhist, the Shinto, the = Jew, and all flavors of Christian all share profound faith in their religion a= nd its revelations. Unfortunately, they cannot all be true, they simply dive= rge on too many major and minor points of doctrine. They can all most certainly be false. The burden of proof is on the practitioner, and since his personal revelation is not available to other= s, he must use some other argument. =0D

Often, particularly in the modern world with knowledge doubling every fe= w years, we must rely upon authority for our personal knowledge of many subjects. There is not time for us to personally test everything, still, = we can make reasoned choices about whom to believe. Real estate speculators depend up= on Architects to design buildings, and construction companies to build them,=

each of them need know little if anything of the others work. They all re= ly on the power company to provide electricity none of them have any deep understanding of. But although each individual can only personally partake of a small total of human knowledge, it is in=

principal traceable to first causes. From the first primitive men with st= one tools and fire to supersonic aircraft and supercomputers, a casual testab= le verifiable chain exists. Our daily lives serve up repeated proofs of the reliability of our physical knowledge of the world, from the very fibers = that cloth our bodies to the internet that this too long message is posted on.=

=0D

Our physical, scientific knowledge of the world passes each and every epistemological test. As much as we can trust any knowledge beyond the fi= rst three absolutes, we can trust modern science. =0D

Anytime someone makes any claims that are not congruent with what we alr= eady know, first, the burden of proof is on him, and second, the standard of p= roof is very high. And the more extraordinary the claim, the higher the standa= rd of proof. Consider, if a friend of mine tells me that yesterday he saw a mouse in his living room, I might simply share anti-mouse strategies with=

him. If he tells me he saw a cow in his living room, well it depends on w= here we live. In some parts of the country that is less unlikely than in other= s. But if he tries to tell me he saw a unicorn, I'll either ask him if he brought it along, or try and change the subject. If = he insists on talking about the unicorn I might even recommend a vacation or therapy. Extraordinary claims requir= e extraordinary proof. =0D

. The biblical story of the crucifixion, for example, is an extraordin= ary story. People who have suffered complete biological death down to the cellular level, do not come back to life. No other ancient text unequivocably mentions Jesus, let alone the crucifixion and resurrection.=

(Such mentions of Jesus as show up are thought by even christian scholars=

to be pious forgeries made by mediaeval monks when recopying older manuscrip= ts) =0D

In the ancient world at that time, virgin births of gods, cleansing of s= ins by blood sacrifice, the sacrifice of a deity, resurrection etc., were com= mon threads in many popular religions. Occam's razor and congruity suggest t= hat the entire biblical account is a pious fraud concocted long after the eve= nts. Pious fraud is common, requires no new principals (it is indeed congruent with what we know of people), and accounts for all of the data. Such evidence as exists is certainly not up=

to the extraordinary level required for the claim. =0D

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