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---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 7 Sep 1995 16:05:13 -0400 (EDT) From: Richard Davis <davis@epas.utoronto.ca> To: apologia-l@netcom.com Subject: Till and Inerrancy - part I
FARRELL TILL, INERRANCY, AND MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE (part I)
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Parred to its essentials, the challenge Farrell Till (editor of _The Skeptical Review_) presents to the defender of gospel inerrancy concerns the following set of claims -- let's call it set `A':
(A1) God is omnipotent
(A2) God is omniscient
(A3) There is more than one inerrant gospel record.
Presumably, Till's claim is that set A is logically inconsistent; therefore, any theist who believes (A1)-(A3) is manifestly and patently irrational. I say `presumably', since Till is not at all clear in the expression of his challenge. Even worse, he seems to use the term `inconsistent' in a non- logical, layman's sense, which isn't obviously relevant to the epistemic charge of irrationality he so desperately wants to apply to the inerrantist. In order to evaluate Till's challenge, therefore, it shall have to be reconstructed for him. In part one, I reconstruct Till's argument and evaluate his attempt to establish the inconsistency of set A. In part two, I show how it can be proven that set A _is_ consistent. My conclusion is that Till's philosophical argument against inerrancy is unsound.
I. THE CASE FOR INCONSISTENCY
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Now the first thing to note about set A is that it's not _explicitly_ contradictory. A set of propositions is explicitly contradictory only if one of the members of the set is the negation of another. But if you look at (A1)- (A3), you will quickly observe that none of these propositions is the denial of the other.
Even so, set A might be contradictory in some weaker sense. Perhaps this set is _implicitly_ contradictory. Perhaps there is some _necessarily_ true proposition(s) such that if added to set A would produce an explicitly contradictory set. (Note: the requirement that the added proposition(s) be _necessarily_ true is not superfluous. For if the proposition(s) in question were only contingently true, then it would still be possible that all of the members of set A be true together, in which case set A would be consistent.)
Well, are there any such propositions? Here _The Skeptical Review_ (in general) and Till (in particular) are silent. However, in personal correspondence, Till has suggested that the missing premise is
(A4) Necessarily, if God is omnipotent and omniscient, then there will
be (at most) one inerrant gospel record.
It is clear that by adding (A4) to set A we can derive an explicit contradiction; from (A1), (A2), and (A4) we can infer the denial of (A3) by the elementary law of logic known as _modus ponens_ (that is, if P then Q; P; so Q).
But unless we get some sort of supporting argument from Till on this point, simply presenting the inerrantist with (A4) seems to amount to no more than the assertion that some of the members of set A entail the negation of some of the others, which is just to say that set A is inconsistent (the very thing to be proven). So merely parading (A4) about is not sufficient to establish the inconsistency of set A.
What reason is there for us to think that (A4) is true? Why think that an omnipotent and omniscient being must produce exactly one inerrant gospel record (if any)? Till has attempted to support (A4) in correspondence by appealing to variants of
(A4a) Necessarily, if God is omnipotent and omniscient, then he can
inspire (cause) an individual S to record a gospel account G which
perfectly communicates what God wants us to know.
Accordingly, if God were to inspire (cause) further accounts beyond G, then G could not have been perfect (contrary to hypothesis). To put it bluntly, the idea is that if you're an omnipotent and omniscient, you can get what you want on the first try. If you can't, well, then how can you call yourself all- powerful and all-knowing?
What shall we say of (A4a)? Is it true? We should note first of all that Till must not only show that it _is_ true, but also that _all_ inerrantists are somehow committed to it. Remember Till charges that _all_ inerrantists are irrational (since they believe set A), so he's got to argue that they're all committed to (A4a) in some sense.
Well, has Till shouldered his argumentative responsibilities here? Far from it. (A4a) is not so much defended as it is asserted. This suggests that Till considers (A4a) to be a _self-evident_ truth. Perhaps when Till reflects on the concept of omnipotence, he just "sees" that it includes the unrestricted idea of _being able to do anything_, or perhaps the more restricted idea of _being able to do anything logically possible_. Therefore, he feels that an omnipotent being would have the power to cause an individual to write a perfect record on the first try. (Does this mean that Till understands (A4a) as an analytic _a priori_ proposition to put things in Kantian terms?)
Suppose we concede the point for the sake of argument. Does it follow that the inerrantist is inevitably committed to (A4a)? Not necessarily. The problem is that (A4a) is unduly inexplicit. It says nothing at all about whether S _freely_ records what God causes S to write. Therefore, we must consider two versions of (A4a):
(A4a') Necessarily, if God is omnipotent and omniscient, then he can
inspire (cause) an individual S to NON-FREELY record a gospel
account G which perfectly communicates what God wants us to
know and
(A4a'') Necessarily, if God is omnipotent and omniscient, then he can
inspire (cause) an individual S to FREELY record a gospel
account G which perfectly communicates what God wants us to
know.
Now it's not clear which of these versions Till intends. We shall therefore have to examine them both.
Consider (A4a') first. This proposition is, I think, quite true. But if this is what Till intends, then he will never be able to justify his claim that inerrantism _tout court_ is irrational. He won't be able to use (A4a') as a reason for thinking that set A is inconsistent, and therefore that _every_ theist who believes set A is irrational. For, obviously, there are plenty of inerrantists who _don't_ believe that the gospel writers were unfree in recording what they did. But then how are you going to show these individuals that their believing set A is inconsistent? You can't use (A4a') against them because they don't believe it; it's not part of the inerrancy doctrine as they see it. In any event, why think it's logically necessary to construe the inerrancy doctrine in such a way that the gospel writers were not free? Where is it laid down that this is the only logically possible way of construing the doctrine? It's perfectly plain to me that (A4a') just won't do the philosophical work Till needs it to do.
What about (A4a'')? Will that be of use to him? Again, I think the answer is that it will not. There is a rather large class of Christian theists (myself included), who, on purely philosophical grounds, would reject (A4a'') as necessarily false, since it requires that God be able to do what is logically impossible. According to libertarianism, free will and casual determinism are logically incompatible; that is, it is logically impossible to _cause_ someone to _freely_ do something. (For a powerful defense of this claim, see Peter van Inwagen's _An Essay on Free Will_. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983, ch.3.) But that is precisely what the consequent in (A4a'') requires; it requires that God cause the biblical writers to freely compose their respective gospels. Christian libertarians will therefore contend that the antecedent in (A4a'') is true, but that its consequent is necessarily false (since it is logically impossible). In short, they will reject (A4a'') as being not just false, but necessarily false.
Again, the question is: how is Till going to show these individuals that if they belief set A, then they're system of beliefs is inconsistent? He can't employ (A4a'') against them; for not only don't they believe it, they eschew it as a necessary falsehood.
The bottom line is this: in order to show the inerrantist that she believes set A (which is inconsistent) and is therefore irrational, Till has to produce some necessarily true proposition(s), which, when added to set A, formally entail a contradiction. Further, he needs to show the inerrantist that she is somehow committed to these additional propositions. What does Till do? He advances (A4), and, in support of (A4), we get (A4a). But (A4a), it turns out, is ambiguous between (A4a') and (A4a''). If he advances (A4a'), then what he says is true, but he loses the claim that _anyone_ who believes set A is irrational. On the other hand, if he advances (A4a''), then what he says is necessarily false (so I say at least), and he still loses the claim that _anyone_ who believes set A is irrational. Either way, then, he hasn't supported the contention that _anyone_ who believes set A is irrational.
Till has a lot of work to do. There is work to be done making clear to his audience just what his argument _is_. There is work to be done disambiguating important philosophical terms. And there is work to be done on proving that set A is implicitly contradictory. But it seems to me that Till's biggest problem is that in his zeal to refute the inerrantist, he has falsely assumed that inerrantists are a monolithic voting block. This, I submit, is what accounts for those radically overdrawn conclusions about the irrationality of inerrantism that we constantly get from him.
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| Richard Davis, PhD (Cand), Dept of Philosophy, U Toronto, 215 Huron |
| St, M5S 1A1, Ph: (905) 727-0361, Email: davis@epas.utoronto.ca |
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